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Abstract
In Booth v. Maryland,1 the United States Supreme Court decided
that evidence relating to a victim’s character and the extent of harm
caused to the victim’s family and community was inadmissible to deter-
mine whether a defendant convicted of a capital crime should be put to
death. The majority in Booth, while empathizing with the grief of a
victim’s family, recognized the potential danger such evidence has on a
jury to sentence defendants to death based on such arbitrary factors as
what kind of person the victim was and the unforeseeable harm the
victim’s death had on others.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Booth v. Maryland,1 the United States Supreme Court decided
that evidence relating to a victim's character and the extent of harm
caused to the victim's family and community was inadmissible to deter-
1. 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled in part by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct.
2597 (1991) (overruling Booth as to a victim's character and the extent of harm to the
victim's family and community).
1
Koller: Payne v. Tennessee: The Arbitrary Imposition of the Death Penalty
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
mine whether a defendant convicted of a capital crime should be put to
death. The majority in Booth, while empathizing with the grief of a
victim's family, recognized the potential danger such evidence has on a
jury to sentence defendants to death based on such arbitrary factors as
what kind of person the victim was and the unforeseeable harm the
victim's death had on others. The Court held that the Eighth Amend-
ment2 required a per se rule against victim impact evidence because it
could lead to the imposition of death for "arbitrary and capricious"
reasons which are not relevant to the defendant's blameworthiness.3
Subsequently, the Court applied the same reasoning to prevent prose-
cutors from presenting similar victim impact evidence in South Caro-
lina v. Gathers.4
However, in Payne v. Tennessee,5 under the lead of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the Court overruled Gathers and Booth, and determined
that victim impact evidence was relevant and necessary to assess the
defendant's "moral culpability and blameworthiness."' In effect, the
Court held that victims' families and prosecutors should be able to tell
the jury at sentencing that defendants deserve the death penalty be-
cause their victim was "a religious man and registered voter,"7 or the
victim's family "received over one thousand sympathy cards, some from
total strangers. "8
Payne v. Tennessee is significant for a number of reasons. First,
considering the current conservative judiciary, the return of victim im-
pact statements bodes ill for opponents of capital punishment; the re-
sult is the potential for a significant rise in the number of death
sentences. Second, Payne creates the risk that capital sentencing will
turn into "a kind of 'moral postmortem' on the relative worth of the
deceased," 9 and, strategically, defendants may be compelled to wage
their own offensive against the presumed good name of the victim, set-
2. The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
3. Booth, 482 U.S. at 503.
4. 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597
(1991).
5. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
6. Id. at 2608.
7. State v. Gathers, 369 S.E.2d 140, 144 (S.C. 1988).
8. Booth, 482 U.S. at 499, n.3.
9. Mark Hansen, Limiting Death Row Appeals - Final Justice, 78 A.B.A. J.
64, 67 (1992) (quoting unnamed experts and death-penalty litigators).
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ting the stage for a drawn out mini-trial into the victim's character.
Finally, defendants may be sentenced to death over life imprisonment
based primarily on the relative social worth and popularity of their vic-
tims and juries may be swayed to impose death based on the eloquence
of family members' and their testimonials of grief rather than the de-
fendant's character and the circumstances of the crime.
This Comment analyses the arguments of the Court in Payne and
concludes that the Court decided Payne wrongly because evidence re-
lating to a victim's character and the extent of harm to the victim's
family is legally irrelevant and creates an impermissible risk of impos-
ing the death sentence in an "arbitrary and capricious" fashion.10 Fur-
thermore, this Comment explores an alternative view of Payne and sug-
gests that the Court could have avoided overruling the sound holdings
in Booth and Gathers by affirming the Tennessee Supreme Court's
death sentence based on the relevant evidence directly relating to the
"circumstances of the crime""1 and under harmless error analysis. Ad-
ditionally, this Comment will review relevant Florida case law devel-
oped since Booth and Gathers and discuss the effect Payne has had on
Florida's standard of review for use of victim impact statements at a
capital trial.
II. PA YNE V. TENNESSEE
A. Facts
On Saturday, June 27, 1987, Pervis Payne ("Payne") visited the
upstairs apartment of his girlfriend with the expectation of her return
from her mother's home in Arkansas." Finding her not home, Payne
returned several times throughout the day, and on one visit left his
overnight bag in the hall. In between visits, Payne spent much of the
day drinking beer and injecting cocaine with a friend while driving
around town.
Later that afternoon, Payne returned to the apartment and, find-
ing his girlfriend not home, went across the hall to the apartment of
28-yea:r-old Charisse Christopher and her two young children, two-
year-old daughter Lacie and three-year-old son Nicholas.13 Desiring
10. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 503.
11. Id. at 507 n.10.
12. Id. at 2601.
13. Id.
19921 1465
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sex, Payne became violent after Charisse thwarted his advances, and a
struggle ensued. Using a butcher knife from the kitchen, Payne bru-
tally attacked the family and murdered Charisse and Lacie - Charisse
died as a result of eighty-four wounds to the abdomen, arms, and
hands, while Lacie sustained mortal wounds to the chest, head, abdo-
men, and back. Miraculously, Nicholas survived despite numerous
wounds that penetrated his entire body.
During the struggle, the neighbor in the apartment below called
the police after hearing screams from the Christopher apartment.14 As
the first officer arrived, Payne was descending the stairs covered with
blood. Payne first stated to the officer that he was the "complainant"
and then suddenly struck the officer with his overnight bag and fled. He
was arrested a day later hiding. in a friend's attic, claiming: "Man, I
ain't killed no woman." 15
B. Procedural Background
The Tennessee trial court convicted Payne on two counts of first
degree murder for Charisse and Lacie, and one count of assault with
attempt to commit murder in the first degree for Nicholas. 6 During
the sentencing phase of the trial, Payne presented the testimony of four
witnesses in an effort to mitigate punishment.' 7 Payne's parents testi-
fied that Payne was a "good son" with no prior criminal or arrest rec-
ord or "history with alcohol or drug abuse"; Payne's girlfriend testified
that she met Payne at church and that he was "a very caring person"
who "devoted much time and attention to her three children" and be-
lieved he was incapable of having committed such crimes; and Dr. Hus-
ton, who testified as an expert in "criminal court evaluation work,"
stated that Payne was "'mentally handicapped'" based on IQ test
scores and was "the most polite person he had ever met."18
The State presented the testimony of Charisse's mother who de-
scribed how Nicholas had been traumatized by the loss of his mother
and sister. 19 During closing argument, the prosecutor, arguing for the
14. Id.
15. Payne, I1I S. Ct. at 2602.
16. Id. at 2601,
17. Id. at 2602. Payne's mother, father, and girlfriend, and Dr. John T. Huston,
a clinical psychologist, all testified on Payne's behalf. Id.
18. Id. at 2602-2603.
19. Payne, Il1 S. Ct. at 2603. Charisse's mother testified:
[Nicholas] cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why she
1466 [Vol. 16
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death penalty, spoke of the character of the victims and the continuing
effects their murder had on Nicholas and the families involved.20
doesn't come home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes to me
many times during the week and asks me, Grandma, do you miss my
Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I'm worried about Lacie.
Id.
20. Id. During closing argument and rebuttal, the prosecutor stated:
But we do know that Nicholas was alive. And Nicholas was in the
same room. Nicholas was still conscious. His eyes were open. He re-
sponded to the paramedics. He was able to follow their directions. He was
able to hold his intestines in as he was carried to the ambulance. So he
knew what happened to his mother and baby sister.
There is nothing you can do to ease the pain of any of the families
involved in this case. There is nothing you can do to ease the pain of Ber-
nice or Carl Payne, and that's a tragedy. There is nothing you can do
basically to ease the pain of Mr. and Mrs. Zvolanek, and that's a tragedy.
They will have to live with it the rest of their lives. There obviously is
nothing you can do for Charisse or Lacie Jo. But there is something you
can do for Nicholas.
Somewhere down the road Nicholas is going to grow up, hopefully.
He's going to want to know what happened. And he is going to know what
happened to his baby sister and his mother. He is going to want to know
what type of justice was done. He is going to want to know what hap-
pened. With your verdict, you will provide the answer ....
You saw the videotape this morning. You saw what Nicholas Christo-
pher will carry in his mind forever. When you talk about cruel, when you
talk about atrocious, and when you talk about heinous, that picture will
always come into your mind, probably throughout the rest of your lives
No one will ever know about Lacie Jo because she never had the
chance to grow up. Her life was taken from her at the age of two years
old. So, no there won't be a high school principal to talk about Lacie Jo
Christopher, and there won't be anybody there to take her to her high
school prom. And there won't be anybody there-there won't be his
mother there or Nicholas' mother there to kiss him at night. His mother
will never kiss him goodnight or pat him as he goes off to bed, or hold him
and sing him a lullaby.
[Petitioner's attorney] wants you to think about a good reputation,
people who love the defendant and things about him. He doesn't want you
to think about the people who love Charisse Christopher, her mother and
daddy who loved her. The people who loved little Lacie Jo, the grandpar-
ents who are, still here. The brother who mourns for her every single day
:and wants to know where his best little playmate is. He doesn't have any-
body to watch cartoons with him, a little one. These are the things that go
into why it is especially cruel, heinous, and atrocious, the burden that child
will carry forever.
1992'] 1467
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The jury sentenced Payne to death on each count of murder.21
Payne appealed, contending that the grandmother's testimony and the
prosecutor's closing argument were constitutionally impermissible and
conflicted directly with the Supreme Court's holdings in Booth22 and
Gathers,23 respectively. The majority in both cases24 held that the in-
clusion of victim impact statements at capital sentencing created an
unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the death penalty in an
"arbitrary and capricious" manner in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.25
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld Payne's
conviction and death sentence, stating that the grandmother's testi-
mony, while "'technically irrelevant,'. . . did not create a constitution-
ally unacceptable risk of an arbitrary imposition of the death penalty,
and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' "26 The Tennessee Su-
Id.
21. Id. at 2601. Payne was sentenced also to 30 years for the assault with at-
tempt to commit murder on Nicholas Christopher. Id.
22. The trial court in Booth convicted the defendant on two counts of first degree
murder and sentenced him to die for the stabbing death of one of his victims. Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 501 (1987), overruled in part by Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S.
Ct. 2597 (1991). The Court held that the Maryland statute requiring a victim impact
statement (describing the emotional impact on the victims' family, the character of the
victims, and the family members' opinion on the crimes and character of the accused)
in a presentence report used by the jury during the sentencing phase of a capital mur-
der trial, violated the defendant's Eighth Amendment rights. Id. at 498-509.
23. In Gathers, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced
to death for beating and stabbing a victim to death in a park. Gathers v. South Caro-
lina, 490 U.S. 805, 807-808 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597
(1991). During sentencing, the prosecutor presented no evidence other than comments
about the victim's character as "'a religious man and a registered voter.' " Id. at 810
(quoting State v. Gathers, 369 S.E.2d 140, 144 (S.C. 1988)). The Court reasoned that
statements about a victim's character posed the same risk of arbitrary sentencing
whether the source is the victim's family or the prosecutor; therefore, the Court held
that evidence of victim character presented by the prosecution during capital sentenc-
ing violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 810-812.
24. In Booth, Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, which Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens joined. Booth, 482 U.S. at 497. In Gathers,
Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices White, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 805-806. Justice White filed a
brief concurring opinion where he stated that unless Booth was to be overruled, he
would join the majority. Id. at 812 (White, J. concurring).
25. Booth, 482 U.S. at 503-509; Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810-812.
26. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2604 (quoting State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 18
(Tenn. 1990)).
1468 [Vol. 16
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preme court reasoned further that the prosecutor's comments concern-
ing the victims' personal characteristics and the emotional harm to the
families involved were "'relevant to [Payne's] personal responsibility
and moral guilt'" and not prejudicial under harmless error analysis.2 1
C. United States Supreme Court Opinion
1. Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,28 began the
Payne opinion by attacking what the Court believed were the two main
premises underlying the holdings in Booth and Gathers: (1) evidence
relating to a victim's character or the effect of the crime on a victim's
family does not reflect on a victim's "blameworthiness" and (2) only
evidence that is relevant to "blameworthiness" is permissible at the
sentencing phase of a capital trial.2  The Court, nonetheless, claimed
that "an assessment of harm caused by a defendant" has always been
of relevant concern throughout the history of the criminal law, and al-
though the principles that shape punishments to fit crimes have varied,
the sentencing authority has always possessed great latitude in consid-
ering relevant evidence."0 Along these lines, the Court argued that
merely because victim impact statements are "of recent origin, this fact
hardly renders [them] . ..unconstitutional.""
The Court next explained that the Booth majority simply misread
27. Id.
28. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Souter joined. Payne, Il1 S. Ct. at 2601. Jus-
tice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices White and Kennedy joined.
Id. at 2611 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion, in
part 11 of which Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined. Id. at 2613 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). Justice Souter filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kennedy joined. Id.
at 2614 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Marshall and Stevens both filed dissenting
opinions, in which Justice Blackmun joined. Payne, I1l S. Ct. at 2619, 2625 (Mar-
shall, Stevens, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
29. Id. at 2605. Evidence about the victim and victim's family were "factors
about which the defendant was unaware, and that were irrelevant to the decision to
kill," Booth, 482 U.S. at 505; therefore, this evidence has no bearing on the "blame-
worthiness of a particular defendant." Id. at 504.
30. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2605-2606.
31. Id. at 2606; see, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (upholding the
constitutionality of a Florida notice-of-alibi rule, similar to recent enactments by at
least 15 other states).
1992] 1469
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the holding in Woodson v. North Carolina,32 the principal case on
which the majority relied. 3 The Court asserted that Woodson only ad-
dressed the issue that mitigating evidence about the defendant's life
and character must not be excluded during the sentencing phase of a
capital trial3 4 because such evidence necessarily shows the defendant as
"'a uniquely individual human being.' "35 "The language quoted from
Woodson in the Booth opinion was not intended to describe a class of
evidence that could not be received, but a class of evidence which must
be received." 36 Therefore, this "misreading of precedent in Booth has
. ..unfairly weighted the scales in a capital trial"37 in favor of the
defendant and at the expense of the victim, the victim's family, and the
community. This argument presumes that a capital trial is a level play-
ing field where each side has equal resources and stakes in the out-
come. However, nothing could be further from the truth: the defendant
is fighting for his life against the state and all it potentially limitless
resources in a criminal prosecution.
The Court also addressed the concerns of the Booth majority that
admitting evidence of the victim's character during the sentencing
phase would create a mini-trial on the victim's character and divert the
attention of the jury away from the defendant and the circumstances of
32. 428 U.S 280 (1976).
33. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2606-2607.
34. Id. at 2607. Woodson asserted that "in capital cases the fundamental respect
for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the
character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular
offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death." Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (emphasis added).
35. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2606-2607 (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 504 (quoting
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304)). The Court in Woodson held that a North Carolina
mandatory death penalty statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
because:
A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character
and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular
offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of
death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from
the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons convicted of a des-
ignated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members
of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of
the penalty of death.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
36. Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2607 (emphasis original).
37. Id.
1470 [Vol. 16
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the crime.38 In addition, the Court considered the Booth majority's ar-
gument that juries would dole out the death penalty based on the com-
parative worth of the individual to the community.39
The Court first explained that while risk of a mini-trial exists,
such evidence about the victim's character is likely to be before the
jury during the guilt phase regardless, and "for tactical reasons, it
might not be prudent for the defense to rebut victim impact evidence
... "40 Second, evidence of a victim's character is not offered to show
"comparative judgments" of a victim's worth to society,"' but is
'designed to show instead each victim's 'uniqueness as an individual
human being,' whatever the jury might think the loss to the community
resulting from his death might be."'42 While this reasoning may explain
the purpose of victim impact evidence, it fails to address the obvious
issue: the effect such evidence has on a jury. Common sense and logic
about human nature dictates that a jury would be less inclined to dole
out harsh punishment if, for example, the victim was a convicted felon
as opposed to a priest.
Due to the Court's inherent criterion in both the Booth and Gath-
ers decisions, the Payne majority expressly overruled the holdings in
Booth and Gathers because the extent of harm to the victim, the vic-
tim's family or community is necessary "to assess meaningfully the de-
38. Id. The Booth majority noted:
[T]he defendant presumably would be permitted to put on evidence that
the victim was of dubious moral character, was unpopular, or was ostra-
cized from his family. The prospect of a 'mini-trial' on the victim's charac-
ter is more than simply unappealing; it could well distract the sentencing
jury from its constitutionally required task-determining whether the
death penalty is appropriate in light of the background and record of the
accused and the particular circumstances of the crime.
Booth, 482 U.S. at 507.
39. Payne, I Il S. Ct. at 2607; see also id. at 2620, 2626 (Marshall and Stevens,
JJ., dissenting). The Booth Court stressed that there exists no "justification for permit-
ting [imposition of the death penalty] . . . to turn on the perception that the victim
was a sterling member of the community rather than someone of questionable charac-
ter." Booth, 482 U.S. at 506. In footnote eight, the Court provided: "We are troubled
by the implication that defendants whose victims were assets to their community are
more deserving of punishment than those whose victims are perceived to be less worthy.
Of course, our system of justice does not tolerate such distinctions." Id. at 506 n.8.
40. Payne, 11l S. Ct. at 2607. The Court borrows the Booth majority's opinion
that raises the question of "the strategic risks of attacking the victim's character before
the jury" during the sentencing phase of the trial. Booth, 482 U.S. at 507.
41. Payne, 11l S. Ct. at 2607.
42. Id. (emphasis in the original).
1992] 1471
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fendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness. 14 3 The Court argued
that proscribing victim impact statements that relate to the extent of
harm to a murdered victim's family and community "deprive[s] the
State of the full moral force of its evidence and may prevent the jury
from having before it all the information necessary to determine the
proper punishment for a first-degree murder."" Thus, the Court agreed
with the Supreme Court of Tennessee that the testimony of Nicholas'
grandmother and the closing comments by the prosecutor illustrated
the extent of the harm caused by Payne, and "that there is nothing
unfair about allowing the jury to bear in mind that harm at the same
time as it considers the mitigating evidence introduced by the
defendant. '45
The Court further justified the introduction of victim impact evi-
dence by asserting the high deference afforded the states in matters
relating to crimes against state law, punishments, and procedures.46 In
spite of the holding in Booth, the Court noted, without any justifica-
tion, that victim impact statements serve a "legitimate purpose" of the
states, 7 and do not lead to an arbitrary imposition of the death penalty
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.48
In explaining its criticism of Booth and Gathers and enumerating
43. Id. at 2608. In a separate footnote, the limitations to the scope of Payne's
overruling of Booth and Gathers states that:
Our holding today is limited to . . .evidence and argument relating to the
victim and the impact of the victim's death on the victim's family ....
Booth also held that the admission of a victim's family members' charac-
terizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropri-
ate sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. No evidence of the latter
sort was presented at the trial in this case.
Id. at 2611 n.2.
44. Id. at 2608.
45. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2609.
46. Id. at 2607-2608.
47. Id. at 2608; see also Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting). Justice
White stated:
[T]he State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evi-
dence which the defendant is entitled to put in, see, e.g., Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), by reminding the sentencer that just as
the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an
individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular
to his family.
Id.
48. Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2608.
1472 [Vol. 16
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an apparent new standard for stare decisis, 9 the Court explained that
while stare decisis is the "preferred course,"50 it is less so in "constitu-
tional cases" and in matters "involving procedural and evidentiary
rules" where reliance interests are not at their "acme." 51 The Court
intimated that merely because Booth and Gathers were decided by
"the narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents challenging the basic
underpinnings of those decisions,"52 future 5-4 decisions of the Court
are ripe for reconsideration and review. The Court attempted to rebut
the dissenters' arguments about stare decisis by citing reference to
thirty-three cases overruled in whole or part during the last twenty
terms of the Court."3
2. Concurring Opinions
Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Souter each filed concurring opin-
ions in Payne5 and raised their own distinct arguments in favor of vic-
tim impact statements in capital offense trials and for overruling Booth
and Gathers.5 5 Specifically, Justice O'Connor argued that the states are
49. See, e.g., David 0. Stewart, Four Spirited Dissenters, 77 A.B.A. J. 40
(1991).
50. Payne, Il1 S. Ct. at 2609. "Stare decisis ...promotes the evenhanded,
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process."
Id. (emphasis original).
51. Id. at 2610. The Court clarified that stare decisis is not "an inexorable com-
mand," especially in constitutional cases where "'correction through legislative action
is practically impossible' " (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,
407 (19:32) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); furthermore, "[c]onsiderations in favor of stare
decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance
interests are involved .... " Payne, 11l S. Ct. at 2610 (emphasis original).
52. Id. at 2610-2611.
53. Id. at 2610-2611 n.l. However, the Court failed to note that "the average
age of the overruled precedents in those cases was 40 years, while Payne overruled a 2-
year-old precedent." Stewart, supra note 49, at 41.
54. In Booth, Justice White filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined. Booth, 482 U.S. at 515 (White, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White and O'Connor joined. Id. at 519 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
In Gathers, Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 812 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). Justice Scalia filed a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 823 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
55. Id. at 2611-2619 (O'Connor, Scalia, and Souter, JJ., concurring).
1992] 1473
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free to justly determine whether victim impact statements should be
allowed as relevant evidence in a sentencing proceeding to show the
extent of harm to the victim's family and community. 56 Juries should
be allowed to see " 'a quick glimpse' " of the character of victims to
remind them of their uniqueness as human beings.57
Starting with the premise that victim impact statements are "po-
tentially relevant, '58 Justice O'Connor asserted that the Eighth
Amendment narrowly limits punishments which are " 'either inherently
cruel or which so offend the moral consensus of this society as to be
deemed 'cruel and unusual.' "59 Victim impact statements, therefore,
do not implicate Eighth Amendment protection primarily because soci-
etal consensus advocates their use, given the recent rise in victim im-
pact legislation.6"
Also, according to the concurrence, due process under the Four-
teenth Amendment affords defendants "appropriate relief" against the
threat of arbitrary sentencing. 61 Furthermore, the statements brought
before the jury in Payne did not violate due process because Charisse's
mother's "brief statement did not inflame their passions more than did
the facts of the crime,' '62 nor did the prosecutor's comments, as the
jury had already seen a videotape of the murder scene.63
In contrast, Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, reiterated his
fundamental opposition to the Court's previous pronouncement that de-
fendants are constitutionally entitled to introduce all relevant mitigat-
ing evidence during sentencing for a capital offense.6 However,'Justice
Scalia went a step further by stating that even if this precedent did not
exist or was overruled, 5 he would still affirm Payne because the Eighth
56. Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2611 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
57. Id. (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2611-2612 (quoting South Carolina v. Gathers; 490 U.S. 805, 821
(1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
60. Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2612. However, Justice O'Connor pointed out that vic-
tim impact statements can be excluded and are subject to appellate review when they
reach the level of "unduly inflammable." Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring).
65. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 876-877 (1982) (state statute
may not preclude the introduction of any relevant mitigating evidence for defendant at
capital sentencing).
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Amendment provides adequate latitude for society to decide "what is a
crime and what constitutes aggravation and mitigation of a crime." 66
Evidently, Justice Scalia sees no inherent problem in a capital sentenc-
ing proceeding where the defendant is prohibited by state law to pre-
sent mitigating evidence but the state is permitted to introduce victim
impact evidence.
-Justice Scalia also advanced his own views on stare decisis. He
began by quoting dissenting Justice Marshall's own writings on the
subject: " '[Stare decisis] is not 'an imprisonment of reason.' "67 By
declaring that Booth "defied reason" and "harms our criminal justice
system and is egregiously wrong,"6 8 Justice Scalia concluded his opin-
ion with a claim that Booth itself defied the principles underlying stare
decisis:
A decision of this Court [i.e., Booth] which, while not overruling a
prior holding, nonetheless announces a novel rule, contrary to long
and unchallenged practice, and pronounces it to be the Law of the
Land-such a decision, no less than an explicit overruling, should
be approached with great caution. It was, I suggest, Booth, and not
today's decision, that compromised the fundamental values under-
lying the doctrine of stare decisis."
Likewise, while not one of the original "spirited" dissenters in
Booth and Gathers,0 Justice Souter concurred with the majority by
arguing that Booth and Gathers were properly overruled because the
Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar against victim impact state-
66. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring). Presumably, Justice
Scalia does not put much stock in the majority's argument that victim impact state-
ments are necessary for a fair and balanced proceeding. See id. at 2607 (the exclusion
of victim impact evidence has "unfairly weighted the scales in a capital trial").
67. Id. at 2613 (quoting from Guardians Assn. v. Civil Service Comm'n of New
York City, 463 U.S. 582, 618 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States
v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., 348 U.S. 236, 249 (1955) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2614 (emphasis original). The concurrence explained that stare decisis
"is merely the application to judicial precedents of a more general principle that the
settled practices and expectations of a democratic society should generally not be dis-
turbed by the courts. It is hard to have a genuine regard for stare decisis without
honoring that more general principle as well." Id. at 2613-2614 (emphasis original).
70. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy,
O'Connor, and Scalia, JJ., dissenting); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 497 (1987)
(Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, Scalia, and White, JJ., dissenting).
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ments.7' Justice Souter noted that a victim's uniqueness necessarily in-
cludes a group of people close to the victim who are harmed as a result
of the murderer's criminal act, and it is that foreseeability that makes
their harm morally relevant to punishment.72 He further echoed the
fear of the majority that excluding such evidence would create an un-
balanced proceeding, given the defendant's right to present all relevant
mitigating evidence. 78
Justice Souter asserted that Booth was decided wrongly not
merely on constitutional grounds, but on the basis that it created an
"unworkable standard" for admissibility of relevant evidence and un-
dermined "individualized sentencing" for capital defendants. 7' The
concurrence explained that evidence relating to a victim's character
and the emotional harm to the victim's family, in most cases, will be
brought out during the guilt phase of the trial and, consequently, al-
ready will be in the minds of the jury during sentencing. 75 In fact, by
strictly adhering to Booth, courts would be compelled to exclude such
evidence as irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, thereby depriving jurors
of "details of context" and requiring states to impanel a new sentencing
jury."6 This result is an impractical evidentiary barrier and an unwar-
ranted imposition on the states. 77 However, this analysis by Justice
Souter undermines his argument: if a victim's character and the emo-
tional harm to the victim's family is already in the minds of the jury
during sentencing, why does it bear repeating through testimony from
the victim's family or the prosecutor? In fact, the repititioned cumula-
tive effect is what creates the impermissible risk of an arbitrary or ca-
pricious sentencing.
For Justice Souter, this "unresolved tension between evidentiary
standards ' 78 at the guilt and sentencing phase provided "'special justi-
fication' "1 to thwart stare decisis and overrule precedent: "Booth
promises more than it can deliver" which is "a sentencing determina-
71. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2614 (Souter, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 2615.
73. Id. at 2616; see also Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting).
74. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2616 (Souter, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 2617.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2618.
79. Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2618 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Arizona v. Rum-
sey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
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tion free from the consideration of facts unknown to the defendant and
irrelevant to his decision to kill."8 With contorted logic, Justice Souter
concluded by arguing that Booth, not Payne, "create[s] a risk of arbi-
trary results."81
3. Dissenting Opinions
Justice Marshall, in his last opinion as a Supreme Court Justice,
dissented from the majority in Payne by arguing primarily the principle
of stare decisis. Justice Marshall harshly criticized the present Court's
"staggering" and "radical" approach to subverting constitutional pre-
cedent: "Power, not reason, is the new currency of this Court's deci-
sionmaking." 2 "The majority today sends a clear signal that scores of
established constitutional liberties are now ripe for reconsideration,
thereby inviting the very type of open defiance of our precedents that
the majority rewards in this case."8" By exposing the Court's true moti-
vation behind Payne, Justice Marshall stated that Booth and Gathers
were overruled not because of flawed principles, but merely because the
Court's membership has changed since they were decided. "
Justice Marshall argued that the majority failed to present "the
type of' extraordinary showing that this court has historically demanded
80. Id. at 2618.
81. id.
82. Id. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall is, of course, refer-
ring to the recent changes in the Court's personnel which has resulted in a staunchly
conservative Supreme Court with Chief Justice Rehnquist at the helm as its primary
driving force. See Marcia Coyle, Complete Control: In 1990-'91, Rehnquist Was at the
Helm of a Solidly Conservative Supreme Court, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 19, 1991, at SI.
The recent appointment of conservative Justice Clarence Thomas to the Supreme
Court only accentuates Justice Marshall's concern. But see Fred Strasser and Marcia
Coyle, Still Searching for the Real Clarence Thomas, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 30, 1991, at
26 (Clarence Thomas' endorsement of Justice Marshall's views on stare decisis in
Payne and his comments that: "You simply cannot, because you have the votes, begin
to change the rules.").
83. Payne, Il1 S. Ct. at 2619 (referring to the Supreme Court of Tennessee's
blatant rejection of the Booth and Gathers precedents); see State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d
10, 18-19 (Tenn. 1990).
84. Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting). After Booth was de-
cided in 1987, Justice Powell resigned from the Court and was replaced by Justice
Kennedy. After Gathers was decided in 1989, Justice Brennan resigned in 1990 and
was replaced by Justice Souter. Since Payne, Justice Marshall has resigned and Clar-
ence Thomas has been confirmed as Justice to the United States Supreme Court in
.1991.
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before overruling one of its precedents."8 Citing the traditional bases
that justify overturning precedent,86 Justice Marshall concluded that
the majority not only failed to provide such bases, but illustrated "its
radical assertion that it need not even try. ''87
Justice Marshall ended his dissent by foreshadowing the demise of
numerous cases decided by a 5-4 margin,88 predicting that the Court's
"short-sided strategy for effecting change in the constitutional order"89
"invites state actors to renew the very policies deemed unconstitutional
in the hope that this Court may now reverse course." 90 The result, ac-
cording to Justice Marshall, undermines the authority and stature of
the Court. He closed with the following remarks:
Today's decision charts an unmistakable course. If the majority's
radical reconstruction of the rules for overturning this Court's deci-
sions is to be taken at face value. . . then the overruling of Booth
and Gathers is but a preview of an even broader and more far
reaching assault upon this Court's precedents. Cast aside today are
those condemned to face society's ultimate penalty. Tomorrow's
victims may be minorities, women, or the indigent. Inevitably, this
campaign to resurrect yesterday's 'spirited dissents' will squander
the authority and the legitimacy of this Court as a protector of the
powerless. 91
Unwavering in his last stand, Justice Marshall ended his notable and
distinguished service with the notion that Payne represents a "looking
glass" through which the future direction of a predominately conserva-
tive United States Supreme Court can be predicted.92 Only time will
reveal whether his dire foreshadowings come true.
85. Id. at 2621.
86. Id. at 2621-2622. The traditional bases are: (1) "advent of 'subsequent
changes or development in the law' that undermines a decision's rationale" id. at 2621
(quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)); (2) "the need
'to bring [a decision] into agreement with experience and facts newly ascertained,'" id.
at 2621-2622 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)); and (3) "a showing that a particular precedent has become
a 'detriment to coherence and consistency in the law.'" Id. at 2622 (quoting Patterson,
491 U.S. at 173).
87. Payne, IIl S. Ct. at 2621 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 2624.
89. Id. at 2625.
90. Id. at 2624.
91. Id. at 2625.
92. Coyle, supra note 82, at SI, col. 2.
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In contrast, Justice Stevens' five part dissent concentrated less on
stare decisis than on the majority's flawed. reasoning and lack of judi-
cial precedent. 9 3 First, Justice Stevens traced a line of decisions which
supported the holdings of Booth and Gathers, and inherently discred-
ited the, use of victim impact statements in death penalty. cases due to
the risk;of arbi trary sentencing and irrelevance. 94
Next,, Justice Stevens ;responded to the Court's contention that the
liberal introduction. of mitigating evidence for the defendant, creates a
"significantly imbalanced sentencing procedure" by explaining that it is
based on ant inaccurate conclusion -and premise. This argument is a
classic non sequitur: The victim is not on trial; her character, whether
good or bad, cannot therefore constitute either an aggravating or miti-
gating circumstance."96 The concurrence pointed out that whereas the
defendant is allowed to introduce all relevant mitigating evidence dur-
ing sentencing," the state may rebut that evidence directly, without the
introduciion of ir'relevant evidence, i.e., victim impact statements, and
may "designate any~relevant conduct to be an 'aggravating factor." 96
Additionally, Justice Stevens' correctly reminds the majority that a
criminal prosecution is not premised on an "even-handed balance" be-
tween the state and'the defendant; the Constitution protects individual
rights and limits the disproportionate power of the state, 97 and, accord-
ingly, rules of evidence are more favorable to the defendant.9"
Also, Justice, Stevens pointed tothe two fatal flaws with victim
impact statements as they :pertain to the Eighth Amendment. First, evi-:
dence ts ;to a victim's character which is not-foreseen by the defendant
is irrelevant to " 'personal responsibility and moral guilt.' "9 Second,
victim impact statements lead. to inconsistent punishments and unbri-
93. See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2625-2631 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. See id. at' 2625-2627; see, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983)
(death penalty punishment requires determination of "character of the individualand
circumstances of the crime");'Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (Eighth
Amendment requires consideration of individual defendant's character and circun-
stances of crime in capital sentencing); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)
(in a death penalty case, the "punishment must be tailored to ... [the defendant's]
personal responsibility and moral guilt").
95. Payne, Il1 S. Ct. at 2627 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis original).
96. Id. at 2627.
97. Id.
98. Id.; see, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 404(a),
99. Payne, 11l S. Ct. at 2628 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Enmund v. Flor-
ida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
1992] 14791
17
Koller: Payne v. Tennessee: The Arbitrary Imposition of the Death Penalty
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
died discretion because the quality and quantity of the evidence can
only be ascertained after the crime has been committed. 100
To justify laws that inherently take into account victim character
as a mandatory factor, Justice Stevens distinguished between legislative
determinations and judicial sentencing: statutes which take into ac-
count victim character act as notice to a defendant,101 whereas general
sentencing cannot foresee the character of every conceivable victim. 02
Additionally, allowing the sentencer to consider a wide range of evi-
dence' 13 excludes victim impact evidence because, much like the threat
of a mini-trial on the victim's character ,104 it "distracts the sentencer
from the proper focus of sentencing and encourages reliance on emo-
tion and other arbitrary factors [which] necessarily prejudices the
defendant."' 05
However, while Justice Stevens conceded that much of the victim
impact evidence would have been properly admitted during the guilt
phase of Payne, and that the jury had sufficient evidence to justify a
verdict of death, the primary concern of the justices should be in cases
where victim impact statements will make a difference in the verdict. 0
In addition, Justice Stevens rebutted the proposition of the majority
that victims require evidence to show they are unique human beings; he
stated that such a notion is obvious and a jury does not need to be
reminded of that fact during a capital sentencing phase. 107 Further-
more, victim impact evidence to show unique character leads to risks of
imposition of the death penalty based on the victim's perceived social
worth. 0 8
100. Id.
101. See id. (explaining that there exists a rational correlation between moral
culpability and foreseeable consequence). For instance, the imposition of the death pen-
alty for assassinating the President or Vice President is consistent with the Eighth
Amendment because the statutory provision supplies the criminal with notice, i.e., fore-
seeability. Id. at 2628 n.2.
102. See id. at 2628. "[T]he majority cites no authority for the suggestion that
unforeseeable and indirect harms to a victim's family are properly considered as aggra-
vating evidence on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 2628-2629.
103. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2629 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 507.
105. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2629 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 2630.
107. Id. at 2631.
108. Id. ("Such proof risks decisions based on the same invidious motives as a
prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty if a victim is white but to accept a plea
bargain if the victim is black.")
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Obviously disturbed by the Court's lack of judicial restraint, Jus-
tice Stevens concluded by pointing out that the majority's decision rests
on "the current popularity of capital punishment" and "the political
strength of the victims' rights movement,"' 10 and that these factors
were predominant in the Court's decision to grant certiorari, rather
than the Tennessee Supreme Court's rationale. 10
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Politics of Victims' Rights
Before analyzing the Court's decision in Payne, a brief discussion
into the background, evolution and objectives of the victims' rights
movement is appropriate. This section will illustrate that the justices
who decided to allow the use of victim impact statements at death pen-
alty sentencing failed to concern themselves with these germane issues.
Since the 1960's, the victims' rights movement has grown rapidly,
undergoing both numerous changes and shifts of focus. These transfor-
mations have ranged from compensation programs concentrating on
victim restitution, to a more dynamic role involving direct victim par-
ticipation in sentencing."' A byproduct of the victims' rights movement
has been the victim rights statement: a statement outlining the impact
of crime on a victim and a victim's family, and which typically is in-
cluded :in a pre-sentencing report that is either statutorily mandated or
recommended by the court.11 Currently, a large majority of the states
have enacted some form of victim impact statement legislation. 11 3 A
109. Id.
110. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2631 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court, thwarted in
its earlier attempts to overrule Booth in Gathers and Ohio v. Huertas, 59 U.S.L.W.
1176 (U.S., May 14, 1991), granted certiorari in Payne; however, because the petitions
did not raise the constitutional issues, the Court ordered the petitioners to brief and
argue whether Booth and Gathers should be overruled. Coyle, supra note 82, at S1.
11. See Maureen McLeod, Victim Participation at Sentencing, 22 CRIM. L.
BULL. 501, 502 (1986).
112. Victim impact statements (oral or written) potentially provide information
about the circumstances of the crime, the victim's identity and character, the extent of
the harm caused to the victim and the victim's family, and an opinion as to an appro-
priate punishment for the defendant. Phillip A. Talbert, The Relevance of Victim Im-
pact Statements to the Criminal Sentencing Decision, 36 UCLA L. REV. 199, 200-211
(1988).
113. See id. As of 1988, thirty-eight states had enacted victim impact statements
legislation. Id. at 200 n.12.
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few states, like Florida, have gone a step further by amending their
state constitutions providing a victim's right to be heard under constitu-
tional dimensions. 114
However, the use of victim impact statements has raised critical
concerns. One important criticism has centered on the objectives be-
hind the use of victim impact statements, and whether those objectives
are being achieved. Whether the objective is satisfactory victim retribu-
tion,11 enhanced efficiency or effectiveness of the criminal justice sys-
tem,' 16 or successful criminal deterrence, incapacitation or rehabilita-
tion,117 there exists considerable doubt and lack of consensus. among
practitioners and scholars as to whether these ends are being achieved.
For instance, judges and prosecutors have shown a reluctance to use
victim impact statements or direct victim participation - reasons rang-
ing from inconvenience or a belief that victim participation will not be
helpful,118 to fear of liability in a civil action." 9 In addition, legal
scholars continue to debate the legal relevance of victim impact state-
114. See infra p. 42 and note 172; see also Patrick B. Calcutt, Comment, The
Victims' Rights Act of 1988, The Florida Constitution, and the New Struggle for
Victims' Rights, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 811 (1988); Debra Cassens Moss, New Tack
for Victims' Rights, 74 A.B.A.J. 32 (1.988) (constitutional amendments have been im-
plemented in Florida, Arizona, Delaware and Rhode Island but not without criticism
from defense attorneys and prosecutors).
115. See Talbert, supra note 112, at 211 (referring to the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986), where Congress
delineated the four purposes of sentencing: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation); see, e.g., Richard S; Murphy, The Significance of Victim Harm: Booth
v. Maryland and the Philosophy of Punishment in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1303, 1306-1309 (1988). Arguably, "the retribution theory of punishment, as
properly understood, focuses on what the defendant deserves, not, what would benefit
society . . . [and] the Supreme Court's decision in Booth . . . is completely consistent
with and in fact required by the retributivist model of punishment." Id.
116. See McLeod, supra note 111, at 505. System efficiency means minimal re-
sistance to process a maximum number of criminal cases; system effectiveness refers to
a more just sentence if the victim participates. Id.
117. See Talbert, supra note 112, at 215-219. Deterrence discourages potential
criminals from committing crimes and punished criminals from repeating crimes; inca-
pacitation removes criminals from society due to future dangerousness; and rehabilita-
tion reforms criminals and modifies their behavior. Id.
118. See McLeod, supra note 111, at 507.
119. See Moss, supra note 114, at 32. Florida State Rep. Hamilton Upchurch on
the impending constitutional amendment for victims' rights in Florida, and the poten-
tial that victims could sue prosecutors for infringing their constitutional rights stated:
"Can you imagine a prosecutor having to contact and consult with the victim at every
juncture?". Id.
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ments at criminal sentencing,' 2" the constitutional issues that are conse-
quently implicated,""' and the underlying motives behind the victim im-
pact movement.' 22 While it is difficult to deny that victims' rights is
good politics, it is also equally difficult to prove that victims' rights
legislation has achieved its promised goals. 2
Apparently, the six justices comprising the majority in Payne did
not feel that this lack of consensus and debate on the utility of victim
impact statements bore mentioning, or perhaps they were uninformed
on the subject. The majority, while recognizing that victim impact
statements are a new phenomenon, 24 avoided the issue of whether they
120. See, e.g., Eric S. Newman, Note, Eighth Amendment-Prosecutorial Com-
ment Regarding the Victim's Personal Qualities Should Not Be Permitted at the Sen-
tencing Phase of a Capital Trial. South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989),
80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1236, 1248-1255 (1990) ("We cannot begin to draw
lines with regard to appropriate punishment in capital cases based on subjective deter-
minations of the worth of the victim."). But see, e.g., Jackson R. Sharman, I11, Recent
Developments-Constitutional Law: Victim Impact Statements and the Eighth
Amendment-Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987), 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 583, 584-86 (1988) (explaining extent of harm is irrelevant during the guilt
stage of the trial, but extent of harm and the victim's character is relevant during the
sentencing stage to show the gravity of the criminal act).
121. See Jonathan Willmott, Victim Characteristics and Equal Protection for
the Lives of Allk An Alternative Analysis of Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina v.
Gathers and a Proposed Standard for The Admission of Victim Characteristics in
Sentencing, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1045, 1057-1071 (1990) (classifying citizens based on
their character to deprive them of life, liberty or property violates the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Note, supra note 120, at 1248 (commenting by
a prosecutor on a victim's character violates the Eighth Amendment because the jury
may impose death based on the victim's character and not the defendant's culpability).
122. Some argue that revenge and retaliation are legitimate and intelligent goals
at the root of victims' rights. See, e.g., George Will, The Value of Punishment, NEws-
WEEK, May 24, 1982, at 92 ("The element of retribution - vengeance, if you will -
does not make punishment cruel and unusual, it makes it intelligible."); Murphy, supra
note 115, at 1333 (utilitarian theories of punishment, such as vengeance to avoid vigi-
lantism and mob violence, while debatable as an appropriate reason for punishment,
nonetheless are constitutionally valid). But see Lynn N. Henderson, The Wrongs of
Victim Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 994-995 (1985) (vengeance connotes a level of
depravity equal to the criminal act and is "uncivilized").
123. See, e.g., Robert Elias, The Symbolic Politics of Victim Compensation, 8
VICTIMOLOGY 213 (1983) (victim compensation has only strengthened police control
and has failed to achieve its goals of crime control and improving cooperation with law
enforcement).
124. Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2606 (1991). Given the level of the
legal debate over victim impact statements and their effects on juries, an enlightened
majority opinion might have addressed some of these concerns by recognizing a need
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actually promote any constructive social purpose such as victim satis-
faction or participation by victims in the criminal justice process. 12
Justice Scalia charged that the decision in Booth "conflicts with a pub-
lic sense of justice keen enough that it has found voice in a nationwide
'victims' rights' movement," without commenting on the merits of the
movement. 126 Justice O'Connor came closest to recognizing the lack of
consensus on the use of victim impact statements by pointing to "con-
siderable confusion in the lower courts" regarding the breadth of the
holding in Booth. 27 Moreover, the justices who decided to overrule
Booth and Gathers did so without any apparent concern whether victim
impact statements accomplished the objectives set out by their
proponents.
B. Victim Impact Statements and the Death Penalty
The Court in Payne specifically rejected the holdings in Booth and
Gathers that evidence of a victim's character and the extent of harm
suffered by the victim's family, presented through either direct testi-
mony of the victim's family or by the prosecutor, is inadmissible at the
sentencing phase of a capital trial. 12 8 This discussion will analyze the
issues of admissability of victim character, and address the relevance
and constitutional flaws in the majority's reasoning.
1. Victim Character
The Payne decision rested on the principle that evidence of the
victim's character is relevant to the victim's " 'uniqueness as a human
being' ",129 which is necessary to avoid "turning the victim into a 'face-
for further empirical studies.
125. Victim impact statements "are simply another form or method of informing
the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question, evi-
dence of a general type long considered by sentencing authorities." Id. at 2608.
126. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia's religion, if you will, appears to
be the will of the people and justice by the public, irrespective of individual constitu-
tional freedoms.
127. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 S. Ct. 805, 813 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall criticized the majority's reliance on Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Gathers over the prosecutorial use of the victim's character by reminding them that the
confusion created by Booth was the issue that was specifically decided in Gathers.
Payne, 11l S. Ct. at 2622 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
128. See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2609-2611.
129. Id. at 2606-2607 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304
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less stranger at the penalty phase of a capital trial'. . .. 13o The ma-
jority argued that just as the defendant is able to present all relevant
mitigating evidence of the defendant's character, fairness dictates that
the victim be given the same opportunity.' 31
Relevance in evidentiary procedure has been defined as "any evi-
dence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable." ' Using this definition, the character of the murdered vic-
tim is irrelevant as to the issue of a defendant's guilt - that is,
whether he committed the act. 133 But the question raised by Payne is
whether this same evidence should be relevant to determine whether a
defendant, who has already been adjudicated guilty, should be put to
death. The Payne majority has expanded the scope of relevancy for
punishment to include victim character and, in the process, has re-
placed the stricter concept of legal relevance with a more flexible con-
cept of general relevance. General relevance is open-ended and without
practical limitation, and can encompass a wide array of factors without
consideration as to their prejudicial effect. Legal relevance, on the
other hand, requires more stringent legal reasoning and sufficient pro-
bative value, and conditions admissibility of evidence based on relative
probative weight verses prejudicial effect.13 Moreover, the Court's as-
sertions that victim character is relevant to determine the imposition of
the death penalty employs the broader concept of relevancy without
regard for probative and prejudicial considerations. 35
The majority's position also raises evidentiary and constitutional
dilemmas. First, the introduction of victim character invites the pros-
pect of a mini-trial where the defendant may cross-examine character
witnesses for the victim or present extrinsic witnesses to rebut the testi-
mony of the same character witnesses.136 Consequently, the defendant
may also call witnesses to impeach the credibility of the victim's vari-
(1976)).
130. Id. at 2608 (quoting Gathers, 490 U.S. at 821 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
131. Id.
132. FED. R. EvID. 401 advisory committee's note.
133. But see Payne, I11 S. Ct. al 2628 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (statutory excep-
tion for public officials where defendant has been given notice).
134. See FED. R. EvID. 401 advisory committee's notes.
135. See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2628-2630 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. See id. at 2607. There is nothing in the majority's opinion that indicates the
defendant would be prohibited from conducting such a "mini-trial"; the Court merely
pointed out that it might not be tactically beneficial to the defendant's case. Id.
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ous character witnesses.13 7 Not only does the prospect of a mini-trial
raise concerns of judicial economy, 13 8 it also shifts the focus of the jury
during sentencing from the defendant and the circumstances of the
crime, to the victim and his character - neither of which is on trial. 139
While in certain contexts a victim's character is relevant to a defend-
ant's criminal culpability, i.e., when the victim's character is an ele-
ment of the crime, generally such evidence risks exclusion on grounds
of "unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury. "1 '0
Second, and more importantly, evidence as to the victim's charac-
ter admitted during the sentencing phase of a capital trial violates the
Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment
because it creates an impermissible risk that the jury might impose the
penalty of death for reasons other than the culpability of the offense
and the character of the defendant.' For instance, family members
who testify are frequently upset and highly agitated, and erupt in
courtroom outbursts. These displays of emotion by a victim's family
and the resulting jury empathy creates the impermissible risk that ju-
ries will sentence a defendant to death based on an emotional reaction
rather than the character of the defendant and the circumstances of the
crime.
Third, admission of victim character evidence permits the sen-
tencer to impose the death penalty based on the comparative social
worth of citizens." 2 This disturbing notion that a defendant who
murders a sterling member of society as opposed to a reprobate should
be more deserving of the death penalty is unwarranted and shocking by
implication."' Furthermore, this elitist view of social worth is in direct
137. See FED. R. EvID. 608-609, 613.
138. See FED. R. EvID. 102 ("These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration . . .[and] elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay . ) (em-
phasis added).
139. See Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2627 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
140. FED. R. EvID. 403 (evidence which is unfairly prejudicial is excluded pri-
marily because it tends to result in improper decisions based on emotion).
141. See Payne, 11l S. Ct. at 2627 (Stevens, J., dissenting); U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
142. See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2631 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Evidence offered
to prove . . .[differences in character and reputation] can only be intended to identify
some victims as more worthy of protection than others."). The majority replies to Jus-
tice Stevens' dissent by stating the empty conclusion that "victim impact evidence is
not offered to encourage comparative judgments of this kind." Id. at 2607.
143. Justice Stevens points out that if a defendant accused of murdering a store
clerk attempted to introduce evidence that the clerk had an immoral character, such
1486 [Vol. 16
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conflict with equality under the law. The equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that the law protect each person
equally, regardless of a person's perceived character.144 Therefore, it is
not surprising that the majority left unanswered the methods for quan-
tifying and qualifying the effect to be given victim character evidence.
The majority's attempt to discount fears that evidence of a vic-
tim's character does not create the risk that juries are more likely to
sentence, defendants to death based on the social worth of victims and
the loss suffered by the community is sheer sophistry. Quite simply, the
Court and the concurring justices failed to give credence to such an
obvious risk which common sense, logic, and human experience dic-
tates. One inevitable conclusion can be drawn: the present Supreme
Court is blindly motivated by a solidly conservative political agenda
which advocates a "tough on crime" stance and espouses victims'
rights, irrespective of constitutional liberties.145
2. Extent of Harm
The majority opinion in Payne held that evidence of the extent of
harm to the victim and the victim's family is relevant to determine a
defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness, and that states
may properly admit such evidence as necessary to determine whether a
defendant should be sentenced to death. 46 Accordingly, it would logi-
cally follow that an assessment of the extent of harm to the victim's
family and the community is a necessary prerequisite to determine the
evidence would be excluded on the grounds of irrelevance; however, "[e]venhanded jus-
tice requires the same constraint be imposed on the advocate of the death penalty."
Payne, III S. Ct. at 2625 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."). For example, if a defendant is given a lighter sentence for killing victims with
character type A as opposed to victims with character type B, victims with character
type A are afforded less protection under the law. See Willmott, supra note 121, at
1058 n.60.
145. Similar sentiments have been recently expressed more eloquently by a cur-
rent prisoner residing on Pennsylvania's Death Row: "Where the issue of the death
penalty is concerned, law follows politics, and conservatives won the sociopolitical bat-
tles of the 1980's on the basis of an agenda which included a ringing endorsement of
capital punishment. The venerated principle of stare decisis meant little in the politi-
cally charged judicial arena." Mumia Abu-Jamal, Teetering on the Brink: Between
Death and Life, 100 YALE LI. 993, 999 (1991).
146. Payne, II1 S. Ct. at 2608.
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proper punishment for a criminal defendant,'" even when the defend-
ant had no pre-knowledge of the uniqueness of the victim nor contem-
plated the consequences of his act.'"
In so holding, the majority in Payne failed to make an important
distinction between two kinds of harm that may result from a criminal
act of a defendant: physical and emotional. Certainly a criminal de-
fendant should be held accountable for all physical and emotional harm
that may befall the victim as a result of a criminal act. Also, it is the
ultimate harm to that victim - death - for which a murderer may
potentially suffer the ultimate penalty - the death sentence. But
Payne proposes to go a step further by making a criminal defendant
accountable for the emotional harm suffered by the family of the vic-
tim. In essence, the majority believes that the death sentence may be
imposed based on evidence of the infliction of emotional distress to a
third party. 149
Practical and fair limits on culpability, or liability, for emotional
147. Id. at 2605.
148. Id. at 2615 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter, in an effort to justify
allowing extent of harm evidence to be included at sentencing to show the defendant's
culpability argued:
[Elvery defendant knows, if endowed with the mental competence for
criminal responsibility, that the life he will take by his homicidal behavior
is that of a unique person, like himself, and that the person to be killed
probably has close associates, "survivors," who will suffer harms and depri-
vations from the victim's death . . . . [Tlhey know that their victims are
not valueless fungibles, and just as defendants appreciate the web of rela-
tionships and dependencies in which they live, they know that their victims
are not human islands, but individuals with parents or children, spouses or
friends or dependents.
Id. However, as Justice Stevens explained, "[tihe fact that each of us is unique is a
proposition so obvious that it surely requires no evidentiary support." Id. at 2631 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). If a defendant can be saddled with this foreknowledge of the vic-
tim's uniqueness as a human being to show the defendant's culpability, certainly a
competent jury is capable of the same, that all victims are unique humans.
Additionally, Justice Souter leaves us with more questions than answers. May a
friend or dependent of a victim testify as to emotional harm suffered during capital
sentencing? May a lover? May a homosexual lover? Are we to assume that all victims
have "survivors" that are qualified to testify? What are those qualifications? Who
would not be allowed to testify? Could an abused spouse testify at sentencing as to a
her husband's (the victim) bad character?
149. See Jeffrey Stoner, Comment, Constitutional Law-Cruel and Unusual
Punishment-Eighth Amendment Prohibits Introduction of Victim Impact Evidence
at Sentencing Phase of Capital Murder Trial-Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529
(1987): Another View, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 1175, 1185 (1988).
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harm to third parties have been spelled out in a different but compara-
ble context. Simply put, in a civil context, the Restatement of Torts
section 46 recognizes limits on liability for outrageous acts - like mur-
der - that cause severe emotional distress to third parties, even if the
third party is a member of the victim's family. 150 The limitations on
liability for emotional distress to third parties in tort is analogous to the
extent of emotional harm to members of a victim's family in the crimi-
nal context; out of "practical necessity" there must be a limit on the
number of people who could recover from suffering emotional distress
as a result of an outrageous act, even when the act was murder.151
However, under Payne, evidence of third party emotional distress that
is insufficient for monetary damages in civil proceedings may be admit-
ted in criminal proceedings to put a person to death. Thus, it seems
from the majority's position that any person, however remote, who
might conceivably have suffered harm as a result of the murder of a
victim, could testify as to the extent of their harm at the capital sen-
tencing of a defendant.
Furthermore, victim impact evidence which relates the extent of
emotional harm to the victim's family violates the Eighth Amendment's
150. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); see, e.g., Koontz v.
Keller, 3 N.E.2d 694 (Ohio Ct. App. 1936) (denying recovery for intentional infliction
of emotional distress from defendant upon plaintiffs discovery of sister's murdered
body).
For instance, if A murders B, B's family, C, cannot recover for severe emotional
distress unless C witnessed the murder, see, e.g., Calliari v. Sugar, 435 A.2d 139 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1980) (denying plaintiffs relief for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress after buying home from defendant and finding defendant's murdered
wife buried in the back yard) or, in some jurisdictions, only if A had knowledge of the
presence of C. See, e.g., Taylor v. Vallelunga, 339 P.2d 910 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)
(victim's daughter denied recovery after witnessing brutal beating of her father by de-
fendant because the defendant did not know the victim's daughter was witnessing the
beating).
151. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment 1 (1965)
("Practical necessity [requires] ... drawing the line somewhere since the number of
persons who may suffer emotional distress at the news of the assassination of a presi-
dent is virtually unlimited . . . .") with interview comments made by the Tennessee
Attorney General Charles Burson who argued Payne before the Court:
The point of our position is that the death of some person may have a
greater societal impact. We used the example of a homeless person and the
President - that homeless person's life as a matter of sanctity and worth
is worth as much as the President's life, but the harm that is inflicted upon
society, it's clear, in dislocation of that society, is much greater.
Review of 1991 Supreme Court Term, (C-SPAN television broadcast, July 20, 1991).
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proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.152 This proposition
is based on established judicial precedent that the discretion of the jury
in imposing the ultimate penalty of death "must be suitably directed
and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capri-
cious action"'153 and must be "an individualized determination based on
the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime.11 54
By introducing evidence of the extent of emotional harm to the victim's
family, the state creates a constitutionally impermissible risk that the
jury's discretion will be unduly swayed by sympathy for the victim's
family and loss to the community. The majority in Payne, however,
ignored judicial precedent and the inherent risk that victim impact
statements leads to arbitrary and capricious sentencing of death.
C. Alternative View of Payne v. Tennessee
Throughout the Payne majority opinion and concurring opinions is
the notion that Booth and Gathers went too far in creating a per se
Eighth Amendment prohibition against the use of victim impact state-
ments at capital sentencing.' 55 This section discusses how Payne should
have been decided without overruling Booth and Gathers based on
Booth's built-in caveat and harmless error. 156
The Booth majority recognized that there existed cases where the
information contained in a victim impact statement would be relevant
and permissible in the proper context: "Our disapproval of victim im-
pact statements at the sentencing phase of a capital case does not
mean, however, that this type of information will never be relevant in
any context. Similar types of information may well be admissible be-
cause they relate directly to the circumstances of the crime."'1 57 While
152. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987), overruled in part by
Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
153. E.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
154. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983).
155. Payne, 11I S. Ct. at 2608-2609 (misreading of Woodson precedent); id. at
2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[P]ossibility that this evidence may in some cases be
unduly inflammatory does not justify a prophylactic, constitutionally based rule that
this evidence should never be admitted."); id. at 2614 (Scalia, J., concurring) (claiming
Booth "compromised the fundamental values underlying the doctrine of stare decisis");
id. at 2614 (Souter, J., concurring) (lack of legal tradition for excluding a crime's
effects on its victims).
156. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 507-508 n.10.
157. Id. It was specifically this language that prompted Justices O'Connor and
Souter to criticize Booth because they believed it caused "considerable confusion in the
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there have been numerous writings on the meaning of this footnote in
Booth,lee it appears that the facts in Payne fall neatly within this built-
in caveat exception.
When the defendant, Payne, murdered Charisse and Lacie, and
attempted to murder Nicholas, he did so with the knowledge that Lacie
and Nicholas were Charisse's children.1"9 In addition, Nicholas was an
intended victim who miraculously survived. 160 Any evidence as to the
extent of physical or emotional harm suffered by Nicholas was relevant
and should have been admitted at the sentencing phase under Booth
because that type of information "relates directly to the circumstances
of the crime." 61 Therefore, evidence as to the extent of harm suffered
by Nicholas, communicated to the court through his grandmother, was
relevant to Payne's moral culpability and blameworthiness. However,
even if prejudicial to the defendant, the extent of Nicholas' harm
should have been permitted because it directly related to the gruesome
facts surrounding the crime. In contrast, the prosecutor's closing com-
ments during sentencing did not pass the Booth exception. The prose-
cutor's closing comments that related to the impact of harm suffered by
Charisse's parents and Payne's parents, and statements about the per-
sonal character of Charisse and Lacie, 162 were irrelevant and impermis-
sible under Booth because they did not directly relate to the circum-
stances of the crime and Payne had no pre-knowledge of their
lower courts about the precise scope of its holding", Gathers v. South Carolina, 490
U.S. 805, 813 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), and created "an unworkable standard
of constitutional relevance .... " Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2616 (Souter, J., concurring).
158. See, e.g., Willmot, supra note 121, at 1071-1076. One can only surmise the
kind of case to which the majority in Booth was referring, but a classic example would
be that of a defendant who murders a victim in the presence of another person for the
sole purpose of causing that person severe emotional distress. But this scenario would
be the exception rather than the rule.
159. See State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tenn. 1990). Payne testified: "And
she [Charisse] was watching my movement in the kitchen, like she-I had saw her. It
had been almost a year off and on in the back yard because her kids had played with
Bobbie's kids. And I had seen her before." Id.
160. Id. at 12.
161. Booth, 482 U.S. at 507 n.10. For example, Payne had pre-knowledge about
the victim's family, namely Nicholas; Payne knew that Nicholas was witnessing his act
of violence and any reasonable person would know that to brutally murder a young
boy's mother and little sister in his presence would cause extensive harm.
162. See Payne, I l1 S. Ct. at 2603 (quoting from State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10
(1990), " '[t]here is nothing you can do to ease the pain of any of the families involved
in this case. There is nothing you can do . . . for Charisse and Lacie Jo.' ").
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Additionally, the majority failed to take the opportunity to specify
whether harmless error could be applied to the impermissible use of
victim impact statements. Harmless error analysis in constitutional is-
sues first requires that the Court determine whether harmless error
analysis applies,164 and then whether the error committed was harm-
less.165 The Supreme Court of Tennessee hesitantly applied harmless
error analysis in affirming Payne's convictions and sentence of death 66
primarily because Booth and Gathers failed to specify whether harm-
less error would apply in capital cases where victim impact statements
were introduced. Recognizing this shortcoming in Booth, Justice Ste-
vens properly stated what the majority's position in Payne should have
been:
In the case before us today, much of what might be characterized
as victim impact evidence was properly admitted during the guilt
phase of the trial and, given the horrible character of this crime,
may have been sufficient to justify the Tennessee Supreme Court's
conclusion that the error was harmless because the jury would nec-
essarily have imposed the death sentence even absent the error.
The fact that a good deal of such evidence is routinely and properly
brought to the attention of the jury merely indicates that the rule
of Booth may not affect the outcome of many cases.'67
Thus, the majority in Payne unnecessarily overruled Booth and
Gathers, by ignoring the exception in Booth for evidence directly relat-
ing to the circumstances of the crime, and failing to affirm the Tennes-
see Supreme Court's use of harmless error analysis to victim impact
163. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 507-508 n.10.
164. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The Chapman rule essen-
tially states that not all constitutional errors in a criminal trial require automatic rever-
sal of a conviction, and it is the responsibility of the United States Supreme Court to
determine what constitutional violations should receive harmless error analysis. See id.
at 20-21 (when constitutional rights are violated "it is our responsibility to protect by
fashioning the necessary rule"). To date, the Court has denied harmless error to only
two violations: the right to counsel and an impartial judge. Id.; see also Arizona v.
Fulminante, Ill S. Ct. 1246 (1991) (overruling previous precedent which held that
harmless error could never be applied to coerced confessions).
165. The Court must determine whether the evidence obtained by constitutional
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
166. See State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 19 (Tenn. 1990) (stating "we think"
victim impact statements are subject to harmless error analysis).
167. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2630 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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statements. Consequently, the Payne majority has directly undermined
the Court's authority and laid the groundwork for future overruling of
the Court's precedents. 168
IV. FLORIDA CASE LAW AND VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS
This section will briefly review a chronological sampling of the
Florida Supreme Court's treatment of the use of victim impact state-
ments during the sentencing phase of a capital trial before and after
the Supreme Court decided Booth, and since Payne. This section will
conclude by speculating how Payne might affect future court decisions
and constitutional protection afforded defendants facing the death pen-
alty in Florida.
A. Before Booth
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Booth, the Florida legis-
lature in 1984 amended its previous victims' rights legislation by al-
lowing the victim's next of kin, during sentencing in a homicide case, to
testify as to the extent of harm caused by the victim's death, including
social, psychological, or physical harm. 69 Moreover, victim impact
statements in pre-sentence reports that described the victim's charac-
ter, the extent of harm to the victim's family, and the victim's opinion
as to an appropriate punishment were routinely utilized by sentencing
168. See id. at 2625 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
169. See FLA. STAT. § 921.143 (1991). The statute states:
(1) At the sentencing hearing, and prior to the imposition of sentence upon
any defendant who has been convicted of any felony or who has pleaded
guilty or nolo contendere to any crime, including a criminal violation of a
provision of chapter 316, the sentencing court shall permit the victim of
the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced, or the next of kin if
the victim has died from causes related to the crime, to:
(a) Appear before the sentencing court for the purpose of making a state-
ment under oath for the record; or
(b) Submit a written statement under oath to the office of the state attor-
ney, which statement shall be filed with the sentencing court.
(2) The state attorney or any assistant state attorney shall advise all vic-
tims or, when appropriate, their next of kin that statements, whether oral
or written, shall relate solely to the facts of the case and the extent of any
harm, including social, psychological, or physical harm, financial losses,
and loss of earnings directly or indirectly resulting from the crime for
which the defendant is being sentenced.
Id. (emphasis added).
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authorities in capital and non-capital cases. 170 Subsequently, Florida
became one of a small number of states17 1 to amend its state constitu-
tion to elevate the rights of victims to constitutional proportions.172
B. After Booth
The first case that came before the Florida Supreme Court, and
the first case in the country to vacate a death sentence pursuant to
Booth, was Patterson v. State.7 3 The defendant, Patterson, was con-
victed of first degree murder and sentenced to death.' 7' At the sentenc-
ing hearing, the victim's niece testified about the effect the murder had
on the victim's children and expressed her opinion that the defendant
should die.175 In vacating the death sentence and remanding for a new
sentencing hearing on the grounds that Booth prohibited such evidence,
the Florida Supreme Court appeared uncertain as to the precise limits
of Booth or whether harmless error analysis was applicable: "Allowing
this type of evidence appears to be reversible error in view of the
United States Supreme Court decision in Booth . . . .
This uncertainty was soon dispelled four months later in the water-
shed case of Grossman v. State. 77 In Grossman, the defendant was
convicted of murdering a state wildlife officer and sentenced to
death.178 On appeal, the defendant argued that permitting the victim's
family members to testify to the judge during sentencing was in viola-
tion of Booth and reversible error.7 9 The Supreme Court of Florida
170. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 473 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
171. See Moss, supra note 114, at 32.
172. The amendment reads:
Victims of crime or their lawful representatives, including the next of kin
of homicide victims, are entitled to the right to be informed, to be present,
and to be heard when relevant, at all crucial stages of criminal proceed-
ings, to the extent that these rights do not interfere with constitutional
rights of the accused.
FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 16(b). The amendment was approved overwhelmingly by the vot-
ers of Florida by a 9 to 1 margin. See Comment, supra note 114, at 812 n.4.
173. 513 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 1987); see also Talbert, supra note 112, at 227
n. 125.
174. Patterson, 513 So. 2d at 1258.
175. Id. at 1263.
176. Id. (emphasis added); see also Booth, 482 U.S. at 496.
177. 525 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1988).
178. Id. at 835.
179. Id. at 836. The following is an example of the testimony from the father of
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affirmed the sentence on the basis that the defendant failed to object to
the introduction'of the victim impact statement at trial.180 By narrowly
interpreting Booth, the court explained that "nothing in the Booth
opinion . . . suggests that it should be retroactively applied to the cases
in which victim impact evidence has been received without objec-
tion."'' Additionally, the Supreme Court of Florida distinguished the
two cases on the basis that the defendant in Booth was sentenced by a
jury pursuant to Maryland law, whereas in the present case, the de-
fendant was sentenced by a judge pursuant to case law after giving
great weight to the jury's recommendation of death.'82
Grossman illustrates the Florida Supreme Court's uneasiness with
Booth's broad holding. In lengthy dicta, the court ventured into a com-
prehensive analysis of judicial precedent for harmless error analysis,18 3
and concluded that since Booth could be read to hold that not all vic-
tim impact statements might promote an arbitrary or capricious impo-
sition of death by a jury, impermissible victim impact evidence would
in the future be subject to harmless error analysis on a case-by-case
basis. 164 The court went on to establish a standard for review of victim
impact statements presented during a capital case. First, the defendant
must object to the victim impact evidence when introduced during sen-
tencing phase.' 5 Second, the jury should not hear victim impact evi-
the victim:
I think he's shattered our family. This girl [victim] was kind of the center
of our family. It's like taking my heart out. It will hurt me the rest of my
life. We have all seen a psychiatrist or psychologist at least twice including
my other two children. My personal feeling is that he should receive the
death penalty.
Id. at 842-843 n.6.
180. Id. at 842.
181, Id.
182. Grossman, 525 So. 2d at 845. To justify the distinction, the court stated
that "[i]f the mere fact that the trial judge (the sentencer in Florida) is exposed to
such a victim impact report is sufficient to render the error per se reversible, all death
penalties in Florida are potentially subject to automatic reversal." Id. at 842-843 n.6.
Additionally, "judges are routinely exposed to inadmissible or irrelevant evidence but
are disciplined by the demand of the office to block out information which is not rele-
vant to the matter at hand." Id. at 846 n.9.
183. See id. at 842-844.
184. Id. at 844-845. In so holding, the Court invalidated the provisions of section
921.143 of the Florida Statutes because it violated Booth insofar as it allowed victim
impact statements to serve, in effect, as an aggravating factor in death sentencing. Id.
at 842; see also FLA. STAT § 921.143 (1991) (still in effect as unchanged).
185. Grossman, 525 So. 2d at 842.
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dence at sentencing.' 86 And, finally, the appellate review court may ap-
ply harmless error analysis on a case-by-case basis. 187
This new standard for reviewing capital cases where victim impact
evidence has been introduced was put to its first test later that same
year in two cases. In Preston v. State, the Florida Supreme Court re-
fused to vacate a death sentence because the defendant failed to object
to the introduction of comments made by the prosecutor during sen-
tencing regarding the character of the victim and her relationship to
her family and friends. 18 Next, in LeCroy v. State, the Supreme Court
of Florida affirmed a death sentence over objections by the defendant
that the introduction of victim impact statements by the victim's family
unduly influenced the sentencer.' 8 9 The majority pointed out that the
jury did not hear the evidence, and the trial judge, who erred in al-
lowing the testimony over objection, did so without the benefit of Booth
and Grossman, and did not use the statements to determine punish-
ment.190 Therefore, the trial judge committed harmless error.19'
The following year, the Florida Supreme Court was again con-
fronted with victim impact statements in Jackson v. Dugger.'92 In
Jackson, the defendant, who was convicted for the murder of a police
officer and sentenced to death, argued that the testimony of a fellow
officer during the penalty phase of the trial was unduly prejudicial and
specifically prohibited under Booth. 93 The testimony provided the jury,
over objection, with information about the slain officer's good character
and the impact the officer's death had on the community and the other
officers on the force." The court agreed, vacated the sentence, and
remanded for a new sentencing proceeding on the grounds that the evi-
dence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 95
Since Jackson, the Florida Supreme Court has had to rule on the
use of victim impact statements in an increasing number of direct and
186. id.
187. Id. at 844-845.
188. 531 So. 2d 154, 160 (Fla. 1988).
189. 533 So. 2d 750, 755 (Fla. 1988).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 547 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1989).
193. Id. at 1198.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1198-1199. The court believed that the evidence had been offered
expressly to inflame the passions of the jury and "was designed to induce a fear for
public safety and to elicit sympathy for the victim." Id. at 1199.
1496 [Vol. 16
34
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 13
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss3/13
Koller
postconviction appeals. For example, in Reed v. State, the defendant
was procedurally precluded from claiming relief for failing to object to
the introduction of the statements;' 96 and in Freeman v. State, the
court held that the testimony of a woman, married to a victim mur-
dered by the defendant in a previous conviction, constituted harmless
error.1 97 Also, in Jennings v. State, the Florida Supreme Court denied
a defendant's petition for habeas corpus based on statements made by
the victim's father and school principal during sentencing that "on the
day she was killed the child was going to be narrator at her school play
because she had learned to read faster than her classmates." '98 The
court stated that the statements were not so prejudicial to require re-
versal under Booth.199
C. Payne and Beyond
Since the Court decided Payne, the Florida Supreme Court re-
cently has had occasion to restate and apply Payne's holding in two
capital cases. In Hodges v. State, the court recognized Payne's recent
overruling of Booth and Gathers, but held that the statements com-
plained of by the defendant were not the type of victim impact evidence
that is still prohibited by Booth."' In Owen v. State,20 the court ap-
plied harmless error to statements made by the victim's father, in spite
of the court's recognition that Payne allowed the use of some types of
victim impact evidence.
In light of Payne, Florida's victims' rights constitutional amend-
ment"" and criminal statutes203 are virtually unrestricted with regard
to the use of victim impact statements during the sentencing phase of a
capital trial. With the exception of statements expressing an opinion as
to an appropriate punishment for the defendant, the victim's family 0 "
196. 560 So. 2d 203, 207 (Fla. 1990) (stating in dicta, even in the event of an
objection, the evidence was harmless error).
197. 563 So. 2d 73, 75-76 (Fla. 1990).
198. 16 Fla. L. Weekly S452 (Fla. June 13, 1991).
199. Id.
200. 17 Fla. L. Weekly S74 (Fla. Jan. 23, 1992) (allowing testimony about the
victim's prosecuting the defendant for indecent exposure, and the victim's sister's
breaking down while testifying).
201. 17 Fla. L. Weekly S71 (Fla. Jan. 23, 1992).
202. FLA. CONST. art. I § 16(b).
203. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 921.143 (1991).
204. In addition to the victim's family, apparently anyone who was so closely
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is now free to give evidence relating the victim's character and the ex-
tent of harm to the victim's family and the community, subject only to
due process restrictions. In effect, future cases like Patterson and Jack-
son will be affirmed, unless the evidence introduced is so prejudicial
and inflammatory that the court decides that the death sentence vio-
lated a defendant's due process rights. The result means less protection
for the criminal defendant against the imposition of the death penalty
in Florida. Also, juries in Florida, in recommending sentencing, poten-
tially will be swayed by sympathy for the emotional loss and suffering
of the victim's family, friends, and the loss to the community based on
their subjective view of the social worth of the victim.
V. CONCLUSION
In essence, Booth and Gathers placed limitations on the use of
victim impact statements by creating an exception for death penalty
cases under the Eighth Amendment. The majority in both cases
strongly believed that consideration of the gravity and finality of the
death sentence compelled the conclusion that the use of highly emo-
tional and prejudicial testimony from victim's families and prosecutors
about the victim's character and extent of harm to the community cre-
ated a palpable and impermissible risk that juries would be unduly and
unfairly swayed. The Booth and Gathers majorities based their fears on
what common sense and logic tells us about human nature when con-
fronted with the grief and emotional pain of others.
However, the Court in Payne, in overruling Booth and Gathers,
ignored this rational and cogent approach by incorrectly reasoning that
the victim's character and extent of harm to the victim's family did not
create an impermissible risk that the jury might, based on sympathy
and emotion for the victim and the victim's family, impose death in an
arbitrary and capricious manner. Instead, the Court relied on a faulty
concept of evidentiary relevance and a severely narrow view of Eighth
Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishments. In so
doing, the Payne majority trivialized stare decisis by providing no cred-
ible justification for overturning judicial precedent. Furthermore, the
Court set the stage for drawn out morality plays in which the victim's
character takes center stage with the net effect that death sentences
related to the victim that they suffered harm is entitled to testify as to the extent of
that harm. See Payne, III S. Ct. at 2615 (Souter, J., concurring) ("close associates,"
"friends," and "dependents").
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will be handed down based on the comparative social worth of victims
and their popularity in the community.
As of this writing, Florida currently has 325 persons on death row
and ranks third among states with death row inmates;2"5 Payne has the
potential to substantially increase that number. Criminal defendants
who face the death penalty in our state courts will have their fates
decided by arbitrary and irrelevant factors inherent in victim impact
statements, instead of the character of the defendant and the circum-
stances of the crime.
Michael P. Koller
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